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This paper examines whether monetary incentives are an effective tool for increasing 
domestic waste sorting. We exploit the exogenous variation in the waste management policies 
experienced during the years 1999–2008 by the 95 municipalities in the district of Treviso 
(Italy). We estimate with a panel analysis that pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) incentive schemes 
increase by 12.3% the sorted-total waste ratio. This increase reflects a change in the behavior 
of households, who keep unaltered the production of total waste but sort it to a larger extent. 
Our  data show that household behavior is also influenced by the policies of adjacent 
municipalities. 
Keywords: Incentives, environment, waste management, PAYT. 
JEL codes: D01, D78, Q53.
                                                 
* We thank Arpav-Servizio Osservatorio Rifiuti e Compostaggio and the three consortia (Priula, Savno, and 
TV3) managing waste disposal in the district of Treviso for kindly providing us with the data and the information 
we needed to develop this analysis. We further thank Viola Angelini, Paolo Buonanno, Francesco Manaresi, 
Raffaele Miniaci, Giacomo Pasini, Bill Simpson, Sigrid Suetens, and the participants of the 2011 ICEEE 
conference in Pisa, the 2011 workshop on “Social Economics” in Forlì, and the 2011 EAERE conference in 
Rome for useful suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply. 
† University of Verona, University of Amsterdam and Netspar, University of Verona, Dept. of Economics, Via 
dell'Artigliere 19, 37129 Verona, Italy, e-mail: alessandro.bucciol@univr.it 
‡  Corresponding author. Postal address: Max Planck Institute of Economics,  Strategic Interaction Group 
Kahlaische Straße 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany. Phone: +49(0)3641-686 636; Fax:+49(0)3641-686 667, e-mail: 
montinari@econ.mpg.de , web page: https://sites.google.com/site/nmontinari82/. 
§ Harvard Business School, Baker Library | Bloomberg Center, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163, e-mail: 
 mpiovesan@hbs.edu 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 0582 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we study the effectiveness of monetary incentives in the context of domestic 
waste disposal. Nowadays this is considered a central issue in the policymaker’s agenda, as 
the continuing growth in population size and wealth make our society produce increasingly 
more waste that we must eliminate somehow. Waste disposal is challenging: available options 
are to bury waste in landfills or burn it in incinerators. However, landfills can store only a 
small part of the waste we produce, and they are often perceived as dangerous to the health of 
citizens (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2000). Incinerators, for their part, are expensive and their 
consequences on health and the environment seem controversial (British Society for 
Ecological Medicine, 2008; Health Protection Agency, 2005) with the consequence that 
citizens are even less willing to host such plants in their neighbourhood. A viable solution is 
then to ask domestic users to sort waste at home. However, sorting waste is not a pleasant 
activity: it requires considerable effort, a lot of time and attention. The goal of this paper is 
therefore to understand if monetary incentives can be used to increase the sorted waste ratio 
(the ratio between sorted and total waste), thus reducing the amount of unsorted waste that 
will end up in landfills and incinerators. As we explain below, the answer is not trivial and 
monetary incentives could even have a negative impact on the sorted waste ratio. 
Historically, in Western countries households used to drop off all their mixed waste in 
special bins placed along the streets, and they were charged a flat fee related to parameters 
such as the house size and /or the number of household members. Local administrators 
progressively started promoting increasingly more accurate collection of sorted waste in the 
streets. More recently, many municipalities have been choosing to collect sorted waste door-
to-door (DtD). DtD is a curbside collection system requiring users to separate their waste at 
home  in  a  specific way (e.g. in bags,  bins, etc)  and following a specific calendar. DtD 
constitutes a nonmonetary incentive to sort waste, with a twofold effect: it makes sorting 
easier for the users, who do not need to carry their waste and drop it off along the streets, and 
at the same time it imposes limits on waste production, due to the constraint on the volume of 
storable waste and frequency of waste collection (Naslund, 1973). In addition to DtD, some 
local administrators abandoned the flat fee in favour of a per-unit fee, the so called “pay-as-
you-throw” (PAYT) system. This pricing system aims to encourage waste sorting by linking 
the fee to the amount of residual (unsorted) waste actually produced. The PAYT pricing 
system generally requires a DtD collection to measure exactly the amount of unsorted waste 
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produced (Kinnaman, 2006). Previous research shows that the joint  adoption of DtD and 
PAYT produced outstanding results with an increase of the sorted waste ratio between 25% 
and 35% (see Miranda et al., 1994; Allers and Hoeben, 2010; and the literature review in 
Kinnaman, 2006). 
However, not necessarily one should expect a positive effect on the sorted waste ratio of 
the PAYT incentive scheme, net of the effect brought by DtD. Compared to the municipalities 
that switched from drop-off to DtD collection throughout the world, only few adopted PAYT 
as opposed to flat fee. One of the reasons is that PAYT may induce users to “hide” part of 
their waste to pay a lower fee (see, e.g., Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996: Levitt and Dubner, 
2009); another is that policy makers may be reluctant toward PAYT since they fear that an 
increase in user fees can disappoint the voters (De Jaeger, 2011). In addition, from a 
psychological point of view, introducing a pricing system that sets a price for the production 
of unsorted waste, may crowd out the users’ intrinsic motivation to sort (see, e.g., Ariely et 
al., 2009; Benabou and Tirole, 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Fehr and Falk, 2002). Our 
aim is to provide a proper assessment of the net effect of PAYT, using reliable administrative 
data. 
In this paper we use a unique panel dataset to disentangle the effect of PAYT from the 
effect of DtD on the amount of waste sorted by domestic users. In addition we study the 
effects of PAYT over time and over space. In particular, over time we isolate the potential 
“learning” effect of every additional year of DtD and PAYT, because users may need time to 
fully understand the incentive and adjust their behavior accordingly (see, e.g., Missios and 
Ferrara, 2011). Over space, we investigate the relevance of the perverse behavior of hiding 
waste and dump it illegally in adjacent municipalities to pay lower fees. 
To this end, we collected annual administrative data on waste disposal over the years 
1999–2008 for the 95 municipalities in the district of Treviso, Italy. We then merged this 
dataset with data on the demographic characteristics of each municipality, provided by the 
Italian National Institute of Statistics. The resulting dataset allows us to control for many 
relevant characteristics of these municipalities and their inhabitants, and to estimate the effect 
of these variables on the sorted waste ratio. 
Our final dataset is unique for at least three reasons. First, prior to the period we consider, 
a law divided the district in three geographic zones, each managed by a different consortium 
to which most municipalities adhered. This means that nearly all the municipalities in our 
sample were not directly responsible for the decisions on waste management; they just 
followed the policy of their consortium. We argue that this exogenous intervention removes 
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the potential endogeneity problem that is otherwise present in similar studies (an exception is 
represented by Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2000), where different municipalities may choose 
different waste management policies; however, in our analysis we investigate whether the 
decision of the waste management policy is indeed exogenous. Second, our sample includes 
wide heterogeneity of policies on waste collection (drop-off, DtD) and payment method (flat 
fee, PAYT) enabling us to estimate separately the effect of these policies. Third, the panel 
structure of our dataset allows us to control for exogenous features such as an increasing 
concern for the environment, and to isolate potential “learning effects” of incentives over the 
years. 
Our results show that well-designed monetary incentives are effective even in the context 
of domestic waste disposal. We find that the introduction of a PAYT system has a significant 
and positive net effect of 12.3% on the sorted waste ratio, which is complementary to the 
positive effect induced by DtD, 15.2%. In addition, the ratio increases by an additional 9.2% 
when adjacent municipalities implement PAYT, and it falls by 11.1% when adjacent 
municipalities implement neither PAYT nor DtD.  Moreover,  we find some evidence 
suggesting that illegal dumping may be a relevant issue at the aggregate level, at least in 
municipalities starting from low sorted waste ratios. Finally, we want to point out that PAYT 
is designed to increase sorting and not to reduce the total amount of waste. Our analysis 
shows that this is indeed what happens: the sorted waste ratio increases but there is no 
reduction in the amount of total waste. This finding implies that users improve their attention, 
ability, and consciousness about sorting, but they do not produce less waste. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data source, 
the history, and the characteristics of the municipalities in our dataset. Section 3 describes our 
empirical strategy, and Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 discusses some open questions 
and presents the directions of our future research. Two final appendices provide further details 
on the data and the waste management systems in these municipalities. 
 
2. The Data 
We collected administrative data on the amount of waste produced annually between 1999 
and 2008 in the municipalities of the district of Treviso, in north-eastern Italy; further details 
on this small but highly populated district are given in Appendix A.1. Overall we have 10 
annual time series observations for each of the 95 municipalities in the district. We ignore 
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data before 1999 because they may be affected by measurement error, as municipalities were 
still in the process of organizing their waste management. During the past decades the 
municipalities in this district showed marked progress in terms of sorted solid waste 
collection, moving from an average sorted waste ratio (the ratio between sorted waste and 
total waste)
1
The building blocks of our dataset are two: first, annual data on sorted and unsorted waste 
production at the municipal level provided by the Regional Agency for Environmental 
Prevention and Protection of Veneto (Agenzia Regionale per la Prevenzione e Protezione 
Ambientale del Veneto, Arpav), that we double-checked with the data available to the 
consortia; second, raw data on the demographic characteristics of each municipality, provided 
by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, Istat), and further 
elaborated by the statistical unit of the Veneto region. 
 of 35.4% in 1999 to a ratio of 68.5% in 2008 (Arpav, 2000, 2009). The sorted 
waste ratio in 2008 was outstanding compared with the national average (30.6%). Many of 
these municipalities are now  among the best practitioners of waste management in Italy 
(Legambiente, 2009) as well as Europe, exceeding by far the targets of sorting set by the 
European Commission (Eurostat, 2010). However, the sorted waste ratio in the district was 
not outstanding in the late ‘90s when DtD and PAYT have been introduced. In the same 
years, other regions in Northern Italy were sorting more than the district of Treviso (ISPRA, 
2011)  and countries  such  as  Germany and the  Netherlands  were  achieving  sorting ratios 
around 30-35% (Eurostat 2003). Hence, the excellent results the municipalities obtained in 
more recent years are possibly related to the change in waste management policies arisen over 
the decade we consider in the analysis. 
Importantly, in our dataset we observe different policies along two dimensions: the 
collection system (drop-off as opposed to DtD) and the pricing system (flat fee as opposed to 
PAYT). Appendix B provides details on the collection and pricing systems. Here we briefly 
describe the two pricing systems. The flat fee is proportional to the user’s house surface and 
/or the number of household members: 
 
  ( ) ( ) 01 .. flat fee No of housesquaremeters No of household members φφ =× +×   (1) 
 
where  0 φ  and  1 φ  are the costs, respectively, per square meter and per household member. In 
this system there is no direct link between the actual production of waste and the fee paid, 
                                                 
1 Because sorted waste is potentially recyclable, many authors use the term “recycling ratio” instead of sorted 
waste ratio (Kinnaman, 2006). 
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even though the number of house square meters and the number of household members seem 
reasonable proxies for the production of waste. However, given a particular house and 
household size, this scheme provides no incentive to sort waste. 
In contrast, the pay-as-you-throw fee establishes a direct link between costs and user’s 
sorting behavior. It is made of a fixed part – which can be identical for all users or determined 
according to specific parameter, as the number of house square meters, etc. – and a variable 
part depending on the amount of the unsorted waste produced: 
 
  ( ) 01 . PAYT No of emptyingsof unsorted wastebin θθ = +×   (2) 
 
where  0 θ  and  1 θ  are, respectively, the fixed cost and the cost per unsorted waste bin emptied. 
Notice that the above formula measures the production of unsorted waste in terms of 
frequency (number of emptyings) rather than mass (kilograms of waste), which happens to be 
less expensive to implement (Allers and Hoeben, 2010)
2: to matter for the calculation of the 
fee is only the number of emptyings of the bin for unsorted waste, disregarding whether the 
bin is filled or not.
 3
  According to equation (2), accumulating unsorted waste is relatively costlier than 
accumulating sorted waste. This may induce users to sort waste inappropriately in order to 
lower the amount of unsorted waste. For this reason a system of monitoring and sanctioning is 
applied jointly with the municipal authorities. Monitoring is simplified by the requirement to 
use transparent bags to store unsorted waste in the bins, and no bag to store sorted waste. This 
makes it easy to check if a household is indeed sorting waste properly; see Appendix B.3 for 
further details. 
 
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of collection and pricing systems in our dataset. In 1999, 94 
out of 95 municipalities in the district were implementing drop-off collection systems with 
flat-fee pricing; only one municipality (Vedelago) was implementing DtD with a flat fee. 
Since 2000, municipalities gradually started changing the policy; as of 2008, 41 out of 95 
were implementing DtD with flat fee pricing, 53 were implementing DtD with PAYT pricing, 
                                                 
2 In fact, PAYT pricing may be linked to either the mass or the frequency of waste. This latter method of 
counting unsorted waste may give rise to the infamous “Seattle Stomp“, where residents compact waste into the 
bin to reduce the number of emptyings. Although less expensive to implement and manage, volume-based fees 
seem less effective than mass-based fees in reducing the production of unsorted waste (Allers and Hoeben, 
2010). In our analysis, however, we assess the effectiveness of the frequency-based fee using a mass measure. 
3 Bins for unsorted waste have a capacity of 120 liters and they may be emptied every two weeks, for a total of 
26 times per year. However, bins are emptied much less frequently (usually between 5 and 8 times per year in 
our sample, depending on the household size) because they are charged a cost. After each differentiable fraction 
of waste is sorted, the quantity of non-sortable waste is conspicuously reduced and it produces no smell. 
Therefore it can be easily stored for several weeks until the bin is filled. 
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and just one municipality (Treviso) was still adopting drop-off with flat fee pricing. Hence, 
our dataset includes municipalities with three types of waste management system: drop-off 
with flat fee (306 observations), DtD with flat fee (372 observations), and DtD with PAYT 
(272 observations). We observe no municipalities implementing drop-off and PAYT. In fact, 
systems with drop-off and PAYT are rarely seen (Reschovsky and Stone, 1994; Kinnaman, 
2006), because they make it extremely difficult to detect users’ incorrect behavior. Appendix 
B reports more details on the historical evolution of pricing and collection systems in the 
district. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the sorted waste ratio in our sample. We observe an 
increasing trend in the ratio with all the waste management systems, even the one with no 
incentives at all (the system with drop-off collection and flat fee). The sorted waste ratio, 
however, is steadily higher in the subsample of municipalities with DtD and PAYT. Our 
analysis in Section 4 investigates whether the higher sorted waste ratio we observe in this case 
is indeed attributable to the different waste management policy. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
2.1. Exogeneity of the Policy Assignment 
In the late 1980s a regional (frame) law identified three geographic areas within the district 
and encouraged the creation of independent, non-profit  consortia of municipalities within 
each area. The regional authority asked – but did not force – each municipality to join the 
consortium in its area. After joining a consortium, a municipality delegates all decisions to the 
consortium; therefore, the municipality is no longer able to make independent decisions on 
waste management but it had to follow the prescriptions of its consortium, made by a board of 
managers. 
The district of Treviso was the first to follow the regional directions. At the end of 2008, 
91 municipalities out of 95 joined the consortium operating in their area; these municipalities 
joined their consortium in different years since they had to wait the expiration of previous 
waste management contracts.
4
                                                 
4 Before the law was introduced, municipalities were in charge of the management of solid waste disposal, and 
they used to contract the provision of this service through external companies. In many cases, before joining a 
  Four municipalities remained independent, essentially for 
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structural or geographic reasons; further details on the history of these municipalities and 
consortia are given in Appendix A.2. Our main analysis, shown in Sections 4.1-4.3, is based 
on 10 annual observations for all the 95 municipalities. In a robustness check, reported in 
Section 4.4, we repeat the analysis based on a smaller sample, including only the 
municipalities belonging to a consortium, and only in the years following adhesion. 
As mentioned earlier, in our dataset we observe different policies along two dimensions: 
the collection system (drop-off as opposed to DtD) and the pricing system (flat fee as opposed 
to PAYT). We exploit this exogenous variation in the policies to disentangle the effect of the 
introduction of PAYT net of the effect of adopting a DtD collection. This environment 
resembles a quasi-natural experiment, because the collection and pricing systems are imposed 
to the municipality by the consortium and, hence, they are not chosen directly by the 
municipality (see Appendix A.2 for more details).
5
One might argue that the selection of the policy is not a completely exogenous 
mechanism, as municipalities can influence somehow the decisions of their consortium board 
and the director. In particular, municipalities with more concern about sorting might push for 
the implementation of DtD and PAYT policies. If that were the case we should see that, 
before the implementation of new policies, such municipalities were having higher ratios of 
sorted to total waste, and /or they were increasing this ratio faster than the other 
municipalities. 
 
To investigate this issue we focus on the 91 municipalities belonging to a consortium in 
2008, we split them in several groups according to the policy they eventually chose, and we 
test whether these groups had different characteristics in 1997, that is, two years before the 
initial period in our sample (1999). Specifically, we compare two groups in terms of the 
sorted waste ratio they had in 1997, or the variation in their ratio between 1997 and 1999. As 
mentioned above, data before 1999 are not completely reliable for some municipalities. For 
this reason we compare different groups by means of a Pearson’s non-parametric median test, 
which is more robust to errors than alternative tests based on the mean or the data distribution. 
We distinguish the sample of municipalities according to the policies they followed in 
2008, where 39 municipalities were implementing DtD collection with flat fee pricing, and 52 
were implementing DtD collection with PAYT pricing. Hence we test whether municipalities 
                                                                                                                                                          
consortium they had to wait until the expiration of previous waste management contracts. For instance see 
http://www.comune.morgano.tv.it/ecologia.asp for the municipality of Morgano. 
5  Ordinary  decisions  in each consortium are taken  by a director and a board of managers, who is elected 
following a majority  principle  by the majors  of all the municipalities adhering to the consortium;  the 
representativeness of each municipality depends on the percentage of its population. Decisions on the waste 
management policy, however, have been made just once, right after the creation of the consortium, by the 
director, the managers and the majors involved at that time. 
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choosing PAYT are systematically different than others. The chi-squared statistic of the 
Pearson test is worth 2.477 (p-value: 0.116) as regards the sorted waste ratio in 1997, and 
3.297 (p-value: 0.069) as regards the percentage variation in the ratio between 1997 and 1999. 
Therefore, we do not find strong evidence of a systematically different pattern between those 
implementing PAYT and those not implementing it. 
Similarly, if we divide the sample according to the policies adopted in 2001, where 48 
municipalities were implementing drop-off collection with flat fee pricing, and 43 DtD 
collection with flat fee pricing, we find a statistic of 0.012 (p-value: 0.912) regarding the 
sorted waste ratio in 1997, and 0.096 (p-value: 0.757) regarding the percentage variation in 
the ratio between 1997 and 1999. Also in this case, the data suggest that municipalities 
adopting DtD are not systematically different from municipalities not adopting it. 
Although not conclusive, this evidence overall supports the view that there are no 
intrinsic differences between the municipalities adopting one policy instead of another, and 
thus the assignment of a specific policy is exogenous. 
 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical strategy is designed to verify the net effect of introducing a monetary incentive 
(PAYT) on the sorted waste ratio, and to understand if this effect is complementary to, rather 
than a substitute for, the one associated with a nonmonetary incentive (DtD). 
  The main analysis is based on the following model, where i denotes the municipality 
and t denotes time: 
  01 2 34 it it it it it i it Y PC DT β β β β β µε ′′ ′′ =+ + + + ++   (3) 
 
where  β0,  β1,  β2,  β3,  and  β4  are coefficients to be estimated,  i µ   represents municipality 
effects, and  it ε   is the error term. Our benchmark for the dependent variable  it Y   is the 
logarithm of the percentage sorted waste ratio (the ratio between the amount of sorted and 
total waste); in addition we consider the logarithm of per capita (sorted, unsorted, total) waste 
in kilograms.
6
                                                 
6 Notice that, although the PAYT formula refers to the frequency of unsorted waste disposal, we assess its 
effectiveness in terms of mass (kilograms). 
 A consequence of taking logarithms in the left-hand side of equation (3) is that 
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the coefficients can be interpreted as relative variations in the dependent variables (thus, 
abstracting from their scale) in response to unitary variations of the explanatory variables. 
  Estimation is performed by means of a fixed-effects panel regression model with standard 
errors clustered at the municipality level. We chose this type of model for several reasons. 
First, it provides consistent estimates even if the specification omits important time-invariant 
variables on the structural characteristics of the municipalities. In general, the coefficients  i µ  
capture all the (fixed) heterogeneity among municipalities that is not explained with the other 
variables in the specification, such as municipality surface or intrinsic efficiency of the public 
administration. Second, we prefer this model for its statistical properties, since it turns out to 
describe the data generally better than pooled regression models (without municipality 
effects) and random-effects panel models (where municipality effects are not absorbed in the 
error term); results of these statistical tests are reported in the bottom parts of Tables 2-4. 
  Below we describe the explanatory variables in equation  (3) that we group in four 
sets( ) ,,, it it it it PC DT , and why we take them into account. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics 
of the key variables in the dataset. 
 
Policy Variables 
Set  it P  takes into account variations in waste management policies. We define the dummy 
variable “DtD” equal to 1 when the municipality is implementing DtD and the dummy 
variable “PAYT” equal to 1 when the municipality is implementing PAYT. The latter variable 
captures the effect of PAYT net of DtD because, whenever a PAYT policy is implemented, a 
DtD policy is always also active. In particular, we are interested in the sign of the coefficient 
on PAYT. If it is significantly positive, then the monetary incentive represented by PAYT is 
complementary to the nonmonetary one represented by DtD. If the coefficient  is not 
significant, we interpret it as an indication that the monetary incentive is not effective. 
Finally, if it is significantly negative, the monetary incentive brought by PAYT is actually 
detrimental and it goes against the nonmonetary incentive represented by DtD. 
In addition, we include variables that capture a potential “learning process” in the 
application of PAYT or DtD policies. What we mean is that users may need time to become 
acquainted with the incentive scheme in the PAYT payment formula, or with the proper use 
of the different waste bins provided by a DtD system. Ignoring this might be misleading and 
could bias our estimates. We assume that this learning process follows a linear trend,
7
                                                 
7 PAYT and DtD programs in our sample started just a few years ago, and we do not have enough observations 
to treat further degree polynomials. 
 and we 
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created the corresponding variables as follows: if a PAYT program started in year
* t , the trend 
variable for PAYT at year t is defined as ( ) { }
* max 0,PAYT t t ×− ; an equivalent definition 
applies for DtD. Thus each variable captures the effect of having a PAYT or DtD program 
active for one additional year. 
 
Context Variables 
Set  it C  includes three variables capturing the context faced by the municipalities. As we 
know, each municipality may adopt one of three policy combinations: DtD collection with 
PAYT billing, DtD collection with flat fee billing, or drop-off collection with flat fee billing. 
The first option provides both monetary and non-monetary incentives to sort waste, while the 
third option gives no incentive at all to sort waste. We expect that proximity to municipalities 
with or without incentives may influence the decision to sort waste. 
  We therefore consider a dummy variable equal to 1 if the municipality has at least one 
adjacent municipality adopting DtD and PAYT, and another dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
municipality has at least one adjacent municipality adopting drop-off and flat fee. In the first 
case we expect a positive “emulation effect” on the sorted waste ratio, with citizens sorting 
waste to a larger extent just because their peers in near municipalities are forced to do so. In 
the second case we expect a negative “dismay effect”, with citizens losing interest in sorting 
waste because their peers in near municipalities do not pay much attention to the issue. 
  Finally, we consider a third dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the municipality 
implements PAYT, and at least one adjacent municipality adopts drop-off and flat fee. In our 
intention, this variable should capture a potentially positive “hiding effect” on the sorted 
waste ratio.
8
                                                 
8 In principle this effect should also be observable, in the opposite direction, if we considered a dummy variable 
equal to one for a municipality implementing a drop-off system with flat fee, with at least one adjacent 
municipality adopting PAYT. In practice, this variable is generally equal to 0, especially in the latest years of our 
sample; this creates quasi-collinearity problems and makes it difficult to find a significant hiding effect. 
 In fact, illegal dumping is one of the main concerns for introducing PAYT: 
Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) estimate that 28% of the observed reduction of waste might 
be due to improper or illegal disposal. In principle, users might throw unsorted waste in the 
bins for sorted waste; however, as mentioned in Section 2, garbage collectors would easily 
discover and sanction it. Alternatively, users might dump their waste in any place, for 
instance in their neighbours’ property or in the street. It should be noticed, though, that in the 
district under investigation i) each user is responsible for its bin, which is usually kept indoor, 
and ii) in the streets there are no common bins where to throw waste, since the municipality 
adopts a DtD collection method. If users really wanted to hide their waste the only viable 
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options are: burn it, throw it in the countryside or in a forest area, or throw it in a nearby 
municipality implementing drop-off, where common bins are available in the streets. The 
latest is a pretty easy option in this district, where municipalities are very close to each other, 
and many individuals regularly commute for work. Citizens are well aware of this option even 
as a consequence of the many articles reported in local newspapers.
9
 
 Since the cost of moving 
from one municipality to the other is minimal, users living in municipalities following a 
PAYT program may choose to throw away their unsorted waste in nearby municipalities that 
are still under a program with drop-off collection, so that they can pay lower fees (the 
“hiding” effect). To limit this “garbage tourism”, municipalities with drop-off waste 
collection put the most sensible bins under CCTV surveillance and ask their citizens to report 
observed misbehaviour in waste disposal to environmental guardians or local authorities (see 
Appendix B.3 for more details). 
Demographic Variables 
Set  it D  takes into account variations in the demographic composition of the municipality: the 
logarithm of the population density (inhabitants per square kilometre), the percentage in the 
population of children aged 14 or younger, the percentage in the population of individuals 
aged 65 or older, and the percentage in the population of non-native residents. All these 
variables show a pattern linearly increasing over time, with the population density going from 
an average 295 inhabitants per square kilometre in 1999 to an average 339 inhabitants per 
square kilometre in 2008, the percentage of children going from 14.41 to 18.16 percent, the 
percentage or retirees from 16.93 to 17.86 percent, the percentage of non-native residents 
from 3.48 to 11.24 percent. 
We include these variables for three reasons: first, the population density gives a measure 
of the complexity of waste collection. We expect municipalities with higher density to be 
structurally different than smaller municipalities with lower density, which should have 
implications on the effectiveness of changing the sorted waste ratio. Second, we expect the 
sorted waste ratio to change in municipalities with a higher percentage of young people (who 
are often the target group of media campaigns on environmental issues) and elderly people 
(who usually do not work and have more time to sort waste efficiently). Finally, we may 
expect that non-native residents are more reluctant than native ones to follow the prescriptions 
of PAYT and DtD programs, for several reasons (culture, language barriers, etc.). 
                                                 
9 See for example the collection of articles published in 2007 and 2008 on local newspapers available online in 
the website of “Treviso Servizi”, the company managing the waste collection in the municipality of Treviso: 
http://www.trevisoservizi.com/index.php?title=rassegna. 
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Time Variables 
Set  it T  includes variables meant to capture the time trend: one macroeconomic indicator (the 
annual unemployment rate in the district, taken from Istat) and a set of year dummy variables 
(the base is represented by the years in the middle of the sample, 2003 and 2004). The idea is 
that at the beginning of the sample period there was less concern for the environment than in 
the following years, as a result of, for example, massive media campaigns. We expect this 
increase in concern to make the sorted waste ratio rise anyway, even if no change is made in 
the pricing or collection mechanism. 
Identification of the year dummy variables together with the variables on the “learning 
effect” of PAYT and DtD is possible in our dataset because in any given year we observe 
municipalities without PAYT /DtD, municipalities that just started PAYT /DtD, and 
municipalities that started PAYT /DtD some years earlier. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
4. Results 
Section 4.1 discusses the effects on the sorted waste ratio, while Section 4.2 focuses on the 
effects conditional on the initial level of the sorted waste ratio. Section 4.3 comments on the 
effects on the mass of sorted, unsorted and total waste. Finally, Section 4.4  discusses a 
robustness check with a subsample of observations. 
 
4.1. Effects on the Sorted Waste Ratio 
Our main results are shown in Table 2. Among the explanatory variables of equation (3) and 
discussed in Section 3, the regression in Column 1 includes only the dummy variable on 
PAYT, and the demographic and time variables; the regression in Column 2 also considers 
the dummy variable on DtD; finally, the regression in Column 3 includes all the policy, 
context, demographic and time variables described in Section 3. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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Following the literature, the specification in Column 1 measures the effect of the PAYT 
policy alone, without trying to disentangle it from the effect of DtD collection. We find a 
significantly positive and large effect of the policy, informing that the introduction of PAYT 
raises the sorted waste ratio by a large amount (28.9%.) This number is in line with previous 
estimates in the literature (see the results reported in Kinnaman, 2006), derived from different 
datasets that do not distinguish between the effects of DtD and PAYT. 
The specification in Column 2 makes a split between the effects of PAYT and DtD. 
Although significantly positive, the effect of PAYT (24.3%) is now slightly lower than in 
Column 1. The reason is that we also find a significantly positive effect of DtD (16.3%), 
consistently with previous works on the comparison between drop-off and DtD collection 
methods (see, e.g., the literature review in Kinnaman, 2006). When not controlling for the 
collection method, therefore, the effectiveness of the PAYT is over estimated. Our finding 
that both the PAYT and the DtD have a positive and significant effect on the sorted waste 
ratio supports the hypothesis that the monetary incentive of PAYT is complementary to the 
nonmonetary incentive of DtD. The absence of negative (crowding-out) effects may suggest 
that the incentive is well designed and aligned to the users’ intrinsic motivations. 
Column 3 of Table 2, which adds all the variables to the specification, also supports a 
significantly positive effect for both PAYT (12.3%) and DtD (15.2%). The smaller size of the 
coefficient on PAYT compared to Column 2 may suggest that in the previous regression the 
coefficient was incorporating also the effect of omitted variables. Indeed, in Column 3 we 
also find evidence of an “emulation effect”: the sorted waste ratio rises by 9.2%, even in the 
absence of incentives in the waste management system, just because adjacent municipalities 
implement PAYT. In our view, users observe  the behavior of their peers in adjacent 
municipalities and tend to replicate it in their municipality. 
Interestingly, there is evidence of a “learning effect” of PAYT (the sorted waste ratio 
increases by an additional 3.1% for every further year of PAYT) but not of the DtD collection 
methodology. We also find evidence that the presence of adjacent municipalities adopting a 
drop-off collection system has a negative effect (-11.1%)  on the sorted waste ratio. We 
interpret this as a “dismay effect”: the proximity to environments in which citizens are not 
required to make any particular effort in sorting (resulting in a low sorted waste ratio) may 
weaken the motivation to sort, diminishing the effect of the monetary incentive. The size of 
this effect is so high that it can potentially offset the positive effect of PAYT.
10
                                                 
10 The sum of the two coefficients, 0.123-0.111, is not significantly different from zero at the 5% level: F test 
0.03, p-value 0.856. 
 Moreover, we 
also find weak evidence (significantly at 10%) of a “hiding effect” of throwing waste 
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produced in municipalities with PAYT in adjacent municipalities with drop-off collection. In 
this case, the sorted waste ratio in the municipality with the PAT increases by  12.7%.
11
All our findings are net of the effects on demographic and time variables. However, only 
including the coefficients of the year dummy variables seems relevant, and it suggests – not 
surprisingly – that the sorted waste ratio tends to increase anyway over the years, plausibly as 
a consequence of a massive media campaign in the latest years. 
 
Despite the possibility to make illegal disposal is relatively simple (due to the closeness of 
municipalities and the high number of persons commuting for work), our results do not 
suggest that this option is clearly exploited (the coefficient is only significant at 10% level). 
We believe this may happen because of a social image concern: citizens fear to be caught in 
illegally disposing the waste, therefore signalling misbehaviour or their poorness (considering 
that the cost for the emptying of the unsorted waste bin is not high).  
One concern with the implementation of PAYT is that it carries higher management 
costs, which are (at least partly) paid by the users. As a final remark, we want to point out that 
with PAYT we find an increase in the sorted waste ratio, and this increase has virtually no 
cost to the households. In 2008 the per-capita cost was 96.00 Euros in consortium TV3 (DtD 
collection and flat fee) and 95.50 in consortium Priula (DtD and PAYT).
12
 
 This happens 
because in the municipalities where PAYT is active, households have a strong incentive to 
reduce the production of unsorted waste. 
 
4.2. Effects Conditional on the Initial Level of the Sorted Waste Ratio 
Our analysis so far shows that both DtD and PAYT programs considerably increase sorting. 
However, the effectiveness of monetary and nonmonetary incentives may depend on the 
initial level of the sorted waste ratio, and one may expect the effect to be lower in 
municipalities already having a high sorted waste ratio. In this Section we focus our attention 
on this issue; our outcome results are shown in Table 3. First, we repeat the regressions in 
Column (3) of Table 2 separately in two sub-samples of municipalities: weak and strong 
sorters. We define “weak sorters” the municipalities with a sorted waste ratio below the first 
quartile in 1999 (37.68%), and “strong sorters” the municipalities with a sorted waste ratio 
above the third quartile in 1999 (44.25%). 
                                                 
11 In a separate regression, not reported, we included the interaction between the hiding effect and the additional 
years of PAYT, to understand whether hiding emerges gradually over time. Our results do not support this 
statement, and we find that hiding is stable over time. 
12 From the Arpav website, http://www.arpa.veneto.it/rifiuti/htm/banca_dati_ru.asp. 
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The output of this analysis is shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. We find some 
interesting results. In particular, we find context to be relevant only for weak sorters: indeed, 
only here there is evidence of an emulation effect (20.6%), a dismay effect (-21.7%) and a 
hiding effect (23.2%). More importantly, the net effect of PAYT is significantly different 
from zero in both groups, but it is larger among weak sorters (18%, as opposed to 11.7% for 
strong sorters). This, together with the positive learning effect of PAYT (3.5%) we observe 
only among weak sorters, possibly indicates that among weak sorters there are higher margins 
to increase the ratio further. In contrast, the effect of DtD is significantly positive only among 
strong sorters with a size of 16%. 
Figure 3 summarizes the average marginal effect of both policies, separately by the initial 
level of the sorted waste ratio. Effects and confidence intervals are derived from a Blundell-
Bover panel regression with the same specification as in Column (3), but including the (log) 
sorted waste ratio in the previous year, and its interaction with the dummy variables for 
PAYT and DtD; the output from this regression is shown in Column (3) of Table 3. The 
figure shows a clear pattern, with PAYT becoming progressively  less  effective as the 
municipality starts from a higher sorted waste ratio, and DtD becoming progressively more 
effective as the municipality starts from a higher sorted waste ratio; the link with the initial 
sorted waste ratio is however higher for PAYT. The figure informs that, for instance, if a 
municipality starts from a sorted waste ratio of 20%, implementing DtD has no significant net 
effect, while implementing PAYT has a net effect of increasing the ratio by 70% (from 20 to 
34%); in contrast, if a municipality starts from a sorted waste ratio of 60%, implementing DtD 
has a net effect of increasing the ratio by 30% (from 60 to 78%), while implementing PAYT 
has no significant net effect. In general, the confidence intervals in Figure 3 (the shaded areas) 
suggest that DtD has a significantly positive effect if the initial sorted waste ratio is not lower 
than 25%, whereas PAYT has a significantly positive effect if the ratio is below 60%. It thus 
seems that the monetary incentive of PAYT prevails over the non-monetary incentive of DtD 
only when the municipality has a low production of sorted waste. 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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4.3. Components of the Sorted Waste Ratio 
We then look more closely at the components of the sorted waste ratio: sorted waste, unsorted 
waste and total (sorted plus unsorted) waste. Table 4 shows the estimates of the model in 
equation (3), where the dependent variable is now the logarithm of per capita sorted waste 
(Column 1), per capita unsorted waste (Column 2) and per capita total waste (Column 3) in 
kilograms. In Columns 4 and 5 we repeat the estimation on the per capita total waste for the 
weak and the strong sorters. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
We chose to look at the determinants of these variables because the sorted waste ratio 
may increase as a result of an increase in sorted waste, a reduction in total waste, or both. 
From the regression analyses in Table 2, we cannot say anything on this issue. However, 
knowing this is important because it provides more precise information on how the PAYT 
incentive works. We expect that, by increasing the relative cost of producing unsorted waste, 
PAYT makes it more convenient to increase sorted waste. In contrast, if the incentive is well 
designed and effective, the introduction of PAYT should have no bearings on the production 
of total waste, producing just a shift from unsorted to sorted waste. Clearly, when making 
more expensive the production of unsorted waste, an alternative for citizens might be to buy 
products with less packaging. This would actually lead to a reduction in the amount of total 
waste. However, at least in the Italian context, this is not a real option since consumers do not 
have the possibility to choose among products with different levels of packaging. They rather 
face a uniform reduction in the packaging which is promoted at the national level by the 
national packaging consortium (Consorzio Nazionale Imballaggi, CONAI), a specific agency 
that essentially encourages firms to reduce the packaging of their products.
13
The regression output supports our hypothesis. Indeed, we find for PAYT a significantly 
positive effect on per capita sorted waste (which rises by 12.4%; see Column 1) and a 
significantly negative effect on per capita unsorted waste (which decreases by 20.3%; see 
Column 2), while an insignificant effect on per capita total waste (the coefficient 0.001 is 
statistically equal to zero; see Column 3). This also suggests that users do not hide waste in 
the presence of this payment system, unless they have a nearby municipality with street bins 
 
                                                 
13 Moreover, the shift toward products with less packaging encouraged by policymakers (see for example the 
Directive 2004/12/EC of the European Parliament) is not automatic especially in consideration of the new 
lifestyle (i.e. increase of single person households, tendency to consume meals outside)  offsetting the 
technological improvements in packaging waste prevention, (EEA, (2005). For further information about the 
Italian case see EEA, (2005) and also www.conai.it. 
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for drop-off collection. In fact, in Column 3 we find a significant hiding effect (-7.2%) for 
total waste, that seems to regard only weak sorters (-10.4%, Column 4). In addition, we find 
that the dismay effect concerns all the waste components, and it is relevant especially for 
weak sorters (Column 4), while the emulation effect of nearby municipalities with PAYT is 
significant only for sorted waste (9.9% for each nearby municipality, see Column 1). We 
interpret this result as evidence that citizens are likely to follow the sorting behavior of the 
neighbourhoods. This observation may influence their sorting behavior more than the total 
production of waste, which is rather linked to consumption habits. In this case, in line with 
Cailas et al. (1993) and Jenkins (1993), we also find that higher population density reduces 
the overall production of waste, possibly because municipalities with higher population 
density on average have houses with smaller surface, which in turn may induce more attention 
in buying products with less packaging.  
The effectiveness of PAYT is confirmed by the evidence of a learning effect that is 
significantly positive for per capita sorted waste (which increases of about 2.4% for every 
further year of PAYT adoption) and significantly negative for the unsorted waste (which 
decrease of 4.2% for every subsequent year of PAYT adoption). These results confirm that 
PAYT does not affect per capita total waste production, but it rather induces users to shift 
from unsortable to sortable products. 
In contrast, we find that DtD reduces per capita unsorted waste (by 3.22%; see Column 2) 
and it also reduces per capita total waste (by 10.1%; see Column 3). Surprisingly, it does not 
significantly increase the production of sorted waste (the coefficient 0.050 in Column 1 is not 
significant). We also find a learning effect of DtD on total waste (that is reduced by 2.5% 
every further year). This effect supports the view that DtD is a form of nonmonetary incentive 
aimed at reducing total waste by imposing constraints to the amount of waste production (e.g., 
providing a given size of personal trash bin and setting a given frequency for waste 
collection), while eliminating the time costs of carrying waste to the streets. While DtD 
induces a reduction in the production of total waste it does not seem effective in increasing 
sorted waste. Hence, even if we observe a similar effect in the sorted waste ratio, the PAYT 
fee reaches this goal by sorting more waste, while the DtD collection method reaches it by 
producing less waste. 
Our results suggest that monetary incentives are an effective tool in fostering the sorting 
behavior at the municipal level, and potentially they can be adapted to reach further goals, 
primarily the reduction of per capita total waste (European Union, 2008). In fact, in Column 3 
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of Table 4  we find that the production of total waste tends to increase over time.
14
 
  For 
example, applying monetary incentives not only to the unsorted waste but also to specific 
fractions of sorted waste (plastic, paper, etc.) may have interesting effects on the reduction of 
the total waste produced and on the economic sustainability of DtD collection. 
4.4. Robustness Check 
We conclude the analysis by reporting on the outcome of a robustness check of our results. In 
Section 2 we explained that municipalities in our dataset may delegate to a consortium all the 
decisions regarding the waste management policies. The exogenous intervention of a 
consortium removes potential endogeneity problems, in that policy makers and municipalities 
with more pronounced concern for the environment –  that we may expect to exhibit 
intrinsically higher sorted waste ratios –  opt for an incentive-based waste management 
system. In our dataset nearly all the municipalities (91 out of 95) delegate the decisions to a 
consortium, and they do so generally early (84% of the municipalities were already members 
of a consortium in 1999; see Appendix A.2). However, we still include observations where 
municipalities are free to choose their own policy. 
For this purpose we replicate here our analysis on a smaller sample, by excluding all the 
observations where the municipality is free to choose its own management system. This 
means that we ignore the four municipalities currently not members of a consortium, as well 
as the observations regarding the remaining municipalities prior to joining a consortium. Our 
final dataset then consists of 865 observations on 91 municipalities (around 91% of the 
original sample), in which the choice of the waste management policy is always set 
exogenously. 
The output from this analysis is reported in Table 5. Our previous results are largely 
confirmed, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In particular, we find for PAYT an effect on 
the amount of sorted waste of 11.7% (from Column 1, as opposed to 12.4%), and no effect on 
the amount of total waste (from Column 2, as in the benchmark), and an effect on the sorted 
waste ratio of 11% (from Column 3, instead of 12.3% as in the benchmark). If we then split 
the sample in the two groups of weak and strong sorters (Columns 4 and 5), our previous 
findings are also essentially confirmed. In particular, among strong sorters we still find a 
smaller effect of PAYT (12.4%) and a larger effect of DtD (15.3%), while only among weak 
                                                 
14 Environmental economists link the growth in the production of waste, as well as the growth in the production 
of energy, to the increase in wealth and welfare (measured by the GDP). In the future they expect this high 
correlation to reduce, because of a more widespread concern for the environment. However, while there is 
already evidence of a “decoupling effect” on the production of energy, the production of waste still seems to 
follow closely the growth of GDP (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2008). 
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sorters we still find evidence of emulation, dismay and hiding effects (respectively 18.5%, -
24.9% and 24.5%). 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we study the effectiveness of the monetary incentive represented by PAYT on 
the ratio of sorted to total domestic waste. Our results suggest that, when well designed, 
monetary incentives work. Indeed, we find that the PAYT incentive increases the sorted waste 
ratio by around 12.3% and that it is complementary to the effect of the DtD incentive 
(15.2%). In addition, municipalities with a PAYT program increase the amount of per capita 
sorted waste by 12.4%, but have no bearings on the amount of per capita total waste. Our 
results were obtained controlling for specific characteristics of the municipalities, and they are 
robust to different assumptions of the model. Our findings thus confirm that, in aggregate, 
well-designed monetary incentives are an effective tool; hence policy makers should not … 
trash monetary incentives, but rather use them to increase the sorted waste ratio. However, we 
find that a PAYT policy also induces an undesired hiding effect: users throw their waste in 
adjacent towns where common bins are available in the streets – at least in municipalities 
where the sorted waste ratio is relatively low. Therefore, a coordination of policies at a macro 
level is necessary to avoid this undesired effect. 
The analysis in the paper is performed at the municipal level. Future research should take 
a closer look at individual data, where  negative consequences may result from adopting 
PAYT for particular users. In our future research we will focus on the following three issues. 
First, we will dig out cases of illegal dumping and garbage tourism in which users try to 
“hide” their waste so that they pay less. Second, we will consider the perceived unfairness of 
PAYT pricing. PAYT is sometimes considered unfair (Batllevell and Hanf, 2008) because 
citizens do not pay proportionally to their income or wealth. Third, we will look at free-riding 
problems. These may arise when the payment depends on the behavior of many users, as in 
multiproperty buildings. We tend to exclude that this issue has a major effect on the aggregate 
results of the current paper, since on average in our dataset there are 1.48 households for 
every building. This suggests that apartment buildings are not so frequent in the district of 
Treviso.  
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Appendix A. Municipalities and Consortia in the Dataset 
In this appendix we describe the municipalities in the district of Treviso (Section A.1), the 
changes introduced by the law on municipal waste management (Section A.2), the three 
consortia operating in the district (Section A.3), and the history of their waste management 
policies (Section A.4). 
 
A.1. The District of Treviso 
As shown in Figure A.1, the district of Treviso (the darker coloured area) is located in north-
eastern Italy, in the region called Veneto (the lighter coloured area).  
 
FIGURE A.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The district covers an area of 2,477 square kilometres. It is one of the most highly populated 
Italian districts (879,408 inhabitants in 2008), with a relatively high population density (355 
inhabitants per square kilometre) and a relatively high rate of population growth (the birth rate 
is 1.07% and the percentage of legal immigrants is 10.9%
15
 
). The district is divided into 95 
municipalities, all close with each other and almost all of relatively small size; an average 
municipality has 9,303 inhabitants. Only one municipality, Treviso, has 82,206 inhabitants; 
24 municipalities have between 10,000 and 50,000 inhabitants; 36 between 5,000 and 10,000, 
and 34 fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. The area is also relatively rich: the average per capita 
GDP in 2008 was 30,274 euros, as opposed to the national level of 26,278 euros. 
A.2. The Legislative Framework on Waste Management 
Italy has four administrative levels (national, regional, provincial/district, and municipal) and 
each one takes some responsibility for waste management. The national level defines the 
legislative framework and sets targets coherent with the European Directives. Since 1994 
each region has delegated the management of waste to an office for “optimal territorial scope” 
(Ambito Territoriale Ottimale, ATO). The office sets targets on landfills for biodegradable 
municipal waste and separate collection of municipal waste. Districts are responsible for 
                                                 
15 Statistics are provided by Istat for 2008 (http://demo.istat.it). The birth rate is computed as the ratio between 
the number of births in the year and the average population with legal address in the district, multiplied by 100. 
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meeting the targets defined by their ATO. To reach the targets, they are free to implement 
their preferred waste management policies. 
In 1988 the regional plan for the management of urban waste created three territorial 
units in the Treviso district (TV1, TV2, and TV3), and promoted the birth of a consortium 
within each territorial unit. The purpose was to centralize decisions regarding waste 
management policies that, up  to that time, had been made by each municipality 
independently. Consortia set the targets for the sorting rates and costs of the system, and they 
decide the management policy, in terms of waste collection and billing. After the creation of 
the three consortia  –  Priula (in TV2), Savno (in TV1), and TV3 –  municipalities were 
encouraged, although not forced, to join at any time the “consortium” managing their 
territorial unit (see Figure A.2). Once a municipality joins a consortium, it can no longer exit 
and it delegates all decisions regarding waste management to the consortium board. 
 
FIGURE A.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Participation was gradual since, according to the regional plan, municipalities were 
allowed to join the consortium in later years, in order to let expire any active waste 
management contract previously signed. In a few years, nearly all of the municipalities had 
joined the consortium in their respective areas, although most of the municipalities (80 out of 
95, or 84%) were already linked to a consortium at the beginning of our sample period in 
1999 (see Figure A.3). Currently 91 out of the 95 municipalities belong to one consortium. 
The four exceptions are Colle Umberto, Tarzo, Mogliano Veneto, and Treviso, which chose 




FIGURE A.3 ABOUT HERE 
 
A.3. The Three Consortia 
We now report some facts on the three consortia. 
Consortium Priula  (www.consorziopriula.it), created in 1987 with the adhesion of 5 
municipalities, now includes 24 municipalities covering an area of 640 square kilometres with 
around 240,000 inhabitants. In 2000 the consortium, constituted by 14 municipalities, decides 
                                                 
16 Geographical limits for Colle Umberto and Tarzo, and high population density for Treviso, prevent these 
municipalities from freely choosing a waste management system. In contrast, Mogliano Veneto chose to follow a 
waste management system in line with the adjacent municipalities in the district of Venice. 
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to introduce the DtD and the PAYT system. In 2008 the municipalities in the consortium 
reached a sorted waste ratio of 77.06%, gaining first place in national rankings (Legambiente, 
2009). 
Consortium TV3 (www.tvtre.it), created in 1993 with the adhesion of 25 municipalities, 
and operates within a territory of 620 square kilometres having around 220,000 inhabitants. In 
2000 the consortium decides to introduce the DtD system. In 2008 the municipalities in the 
consortium reached a sorted waste ratio of 66.56%. 
Consortium Savno  (www.savnoservizi.it),  created in 1995 with the adhesion of 6 
municipalities, now operates in 42 municipalities covering an area of 1,080 square kilometers 
with around 298,000 inhabitants. In 2008 the municipalities in the consortium reached a 
sorted waste ratio of 72.53%, gaining third place in national rankings (Legambiente, 2009). 
 
A.4. The Waste Management Systems Adopted by the Consortia 
Even though in 1999 all the municipalities were adopting the same collection methods (drop-
off) and pricing systems (flat fee), since 2000 they started to follow different policies. In 
particular, in 2000, Priula introduced in some municipalities a DtD program paired in the 
following year with a PAYT program based on the volume of unsorted nonrecyclable waste 
produced. The volume is measured by counting the number of times during the year that 
specific trash bins of unsorted waste are emptied. These bins have a capacity of 120 litres and 
are emptied no more often than every two weeks. Given this limit on the maximal frequency, 
a maximum of 26 emptyings per year is possible. In 2008 the average number of emptyings 
per year was between 5 and 8, depending on the number of household members. In 2008 the 
annual cost per household was approximately 140.11 euros in Priula.
17
Consortium TV3 also started introducing DtD in 2000 but, contrary to Priula, it kept 
using flat-fee pricing rather than PAYT pricing up to 2008. In the second semester of 2009 
TV3 also started a PAYT program similar to the one in Priula. We did not use this 
information in our analysis; we instead stopped our dataset at the end of 2008, because data 
for 2009 are likely affected by the transition from one system to the other (our end-of-year 
data would be a mix between what happened in both the first semester with flat-fee pricing, 
 
                                                 
17 Pricing follows the PAYT equation, Eq. (2). For flat buildings the variable part of PAYT depends on the 
volume of the common cart and on the number of times that the cart is emptied divided by the number of flats. 
On average, in 2008 the fixed cost 
0 θ  was equal to 82.38 euros, and the variable cost 
1 θ  was equal to 10.39 
euros per emptying. Costs vary over the years. In particular, fixed costs depend on a number of factors, not all 
strictly related to the collection of waste (such as municipality taxes). Variable costs are instead independently 
determined by the consortium, and every year they grow with inflation. 
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and the second semester with PAYT). In 2008 the annual cost per household was 
approximately 140.84 euros in TV3.
18
The third consortium, Savno, adopted a DtD collection system but it is more 
heterogeneous in the pricing systems. In some municipalities the consortium experiments a 
flat fee, which depends only on each house’s surface and/or on the number of family 
components similar to the one adopted in TV3; in other municipalities the consortium adopts 
a volume-based pricing system similar to the one in Priula.
  
 
In each municipality where a DtD program is active, the recyclable fractions of waste 
(e.g. organic, plastic, paper, glass, cans, etc) are sorted by each user in the house and then 
stored into specific bins provided by the consortium which have identical capacity for each 
user. The collection of each fraction has different frequencies and follows a calendar. Specific 
instructions are given for sorting every fraction of recyclable waste: i.e., glass and plastic 
containers have to be cleaned and every piece of paper on them has to be removed, otherwise 
the workers in charge cannot collect them. 
 
Appendix B. Waste Collection and Pricing Systems 
In this appendix we describe drop-off and DtD collection systems (Section B.1) and flat-fee 
and PAYT pricing systems (Section B.2). We conclude this appendix with details on the 
monitoring and sanctioning activity. 
 
B.1. Waste Collection Systems 
In 1999 all the municipalities in the district were implementing drop-off collection systems 
with flat-fee pricing. Sorting of municipal waste through a drop-off program consists of 
placing different types of large trash bins for different types of waste (drop-off points) at 
various places along the street. Users then voluntarily leave their waste (see Figure B.1). 
 
FIGURE B.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The DtD collection system assigns to each household different small trash bins for 
different types of waste (see Figure B.2).  Waste is sorted and kept in each house until the day 
                                                 
18 Pricing follows the flat-fee formula of Eq. (1). Coefficients differ for each municipality, because they depend 
on a number of factors such as population size and tourist arrivals. They also depend on the nature of the service 
(e.g., museums have to pay less than restaurants and private houses have to pay less than shops). 
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on which it is going to be collected, where bins are placed in the streets, just outside each 
house. 
 
FIGURE B.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Waste is collected periodically according to a calendar that is given to the users, such as the 
one shown in Figure B.3. 
 
FIGURE B.3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The consortia share similar schedules for waste collection and similar carts and bins for 
waste storage. Moreover, the type of material admitted in each sorted fraction (plastic, paper, 
glass, etc.) is identical across the consortia as defined in the European Commission Decision 
2000/532/CE. 
 
B.2. Waste Pricing Systems 
Two alternative pricing systems have been adopted by the consortia in the district of Treviso: 
a flat fee and PAYT.  
The flat fee price is calculated according to Eq. (1) and it is proportional to the user’s 
house surface and/or the number of household members. Table B.1 shows an example of how 
the flat fee is calculated in TV3 in the 2008; the table informs on the lower bound of the cost 
per square meter,  0 φ , and the lower bound of the variable cost,  1 φ , which differs with the 
household size. Each municipality can freely increase the parameters  0 φ   and  1 φ   up to a 
ceiling, depending on such factors as the population of the municipality and the level of 
tourism. 
 
TABLE B.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In contrast to the flat fee, PAYT links costs with users’ sorting behavior. Therefore, the 
implementation of a PAYT pricing system requires the ability to identify who produces what. 
In Priula and in some municipalities of Savno, identification is possible through an 
electromagnetic transponder installed in every unsorted waste bin (see Figure B.4). Every 
time the cart is placed outside the house for collection, a reader device turns the signal into an 
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alphanumeric code that unequivocally identifies the cart and the owner. This way data on the 
unsorted waste production for each user are recorder and processed. 
In principle, identification of the amount of waste produced is possible not only with DtD 
collection, but also with drop-off collection. For instance, each household might pass a 
magnetic card through a card reader device every time it throws waste into a common bin. In 
that case, it becomes difficult to measure the amount of waste thrown, because people might 
choose to throw more waste less frequently or mix unsorted waste with sorted waste. For this 
reason, cases with PAYT and drop-off collection are rare in practice and limited to few 
municipalities. 
 
FIGURE B.4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The calculation of the PAYT fee is made according to Eq. (2) and it is proportional to the 
number of emptyings of an unsorted waste cart. Fixed and variable costs vary over the years; 
in 2008 the average fixed cost was equal to  0 82.38 θ =  Euros, and the average variable cost 
was equal to  1 10.39 θ =  euros per emptied waste bin. Figure B.5 shows the growth of the 
average PAYT fee per household in Priula from 2001 to 2008 as opposed to price growth (as 
measured with the CPI index, from Istat). It turns out that the average PAYT fee has 
decreased over the years in real terms, from 160.25 euros in 2001 to 140.11 euros in 2008 
(based on 2008). Notice in particular that the average fee markedly dropped in 2002, that is, 
in the year when many municipalities in Priula (14 out of 24) moved to a PAYT system. 
 
FIGURE B.5 ABOUT HERE 
 
B.3. The Monitoring Activity and Sanctioning System 
In order for the PAYT system to be effective, it is necessary to detect  and sanction 
irregularities in the waste sorting with monitoring activities. 
The monitoring activity is assigned to both the waste collectors and to the so-called 
“ecovigili” (environmental guardians) with the power to inspect the quality of sorting also in 
the users’ house by their own initiative or by call of other citizens. The management staff of 
consortium Priula told us that around 2,000 inspections are run every year in the district of 
Treviso. Once an irregularity is detected, by either the waste collector (see the report sheet in 
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Figure B.6) or the “ecovigili”, each consortium applies sanctions which usually consist of 




FIGURE B.6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Generally monitoring and sanctioning systems are implemented not only in the municipalities 
where a flat fee is applied but they are sometimes operating in municipalities where waste is 
collected with a drop-off method. In this second case, as in Treviso, for example, the 
monitoring system is also conducted by the company in charge of the waste management who 
associate to each neighbourhood of the city an environmental operator who has the task of 
taking care of the correct waste collection and sorting in that area and of detecting 
irregularities in sorting preventing illegal dumping by inhabitants of adjacent municipalities 
where a PAYT system is adopted. In addition, in the city of Treviso many bins are under 
CCTV surveillance, especially those in areas where garbage tourism is more likely.  
 
                                                 
19 For example, for the consortium Priula, rules for inspections and fines are reported in the document (in 
Italian) available at (www.consorziopriula.it/dynamic_downloads/_133_Regolamento_gestione_2006.pdf. 
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TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics: average values (from 950 observations in 95 municipalities) 
Variable  Source  Median  Average  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Sorted waste ratio (%)  Arpav  63.10  58.98  15.40  6.12  84.40 
Total waste (ton)  Arpav  1,992.70  3,341.76  5,249.89  298.86  50,244.36 
Total waste per capita (kg.)  Arpav  328.66  338.94  74.38  171.42  611.20 
Unsorted waste per capita (kg.)  Arpav  125.91  140.34  68.58  48.62  440.11 
Sorted waste per capita (kg.)  Arpav  203.53  198.60  64.56  23.12  385.73 
Year of PAYT implementation  Arpav  2004  2003  1.66  2002  2008 
PAYT  Arpav  0  0.29  0.45  0  1 
Years of PAYT  Arpav  0  0.67  1.42  0  6 
Year of DtD implementation  Arpav  2002  2002  1.91  1994  2008 
DtD  Arpav  1  0.68  0.47  0  1 
Years of DtD  Arpav  1  2.19  2.48  0  14 
If adjacent municipalities 
with DtD and PAYT  Arpav  0  0.48  0.50  0  1 
If adjacent municipalities 
with drop-off and flat fee  Arpav  1  0.56  0.50  0  1 
% Children aged 14 or younger  Istat  15.17  15.29  1.82  10.65  24.70 
Population density  Istat  261.16  316.11  200.79  67.58  1512.99 
% Adults aged 65 or older  Istat  17.43  17.38  2.88  10.17  25.22 
% Non-native residents  Istat  6.93  7.43  3.82  0.83  20.05 
% District unemployment rate  Istat  3.40  3.32  0.57  2.50  4.10 
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TABLE 2. Effects on the (log) sorted waste ratio 
Method: Panel OLS with Fixed Effects  (1)  (2)  (3) 
PAYT  0.289***  0.243***  0.123*** 
  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.044) 
Additional years of PAYT      0.031*** 
      (0.010) 
DtD    0.163***  0.152*** 
    (0.042)  (0.056) 
Additional years of DtD      0.001 
      (0.024) 
If adjacent municipalities      0.092*** 
with DtD and PAYT      (0.035) 
If adjacent municipalities      -0.111*** 
with drop-off and flat fee      (0.041) 
PAYT × If adjacent municipalities      0.127* 
with drop-off and flat fee      (0.068) 
Log(population density)  0.974  1.194*  0.992 
  (0.604)  (0.616)  (0.635) 
% Children aged 14 or younger  0.051**  0.042*  0.042* 
  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.023) 
% Adults aged 65 or older  0.005  0.015  0.013 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.023) 
% Non-native residents  -0.013  -0.010  -0.012 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
% Unemployment rate in the district  -0.004  -0.019  -0.049 
  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.044) 
Year 1999  -0.444***  -0.313***  -0.271*** 
  (0.062)  (0.077)  (0.071) 
Year 2000  -0.326***  -0.227***  -0.185*** 
  (0.048)  (0.056)  (0.052) 
Year 2001  -0.188***  -0.143***  -0.141*** 
  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
Year 2002  -0.250***  -0.180**  -0.171** 
  (0.085)  (0.086)  (0.079) 
Year 2005  0.006  -0.010  -0.023 
  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.027) 
Year 2006  0.016  -0.014  -0.057 
  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.075) 
Year 2007  0.016  -0.014  -0.058 
  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.083) 
Year 2008  0.018  -0.025  -0.097 
  (0.068)  (0.069)  (0.129) 
Constant  -2.160  -3.516  -2.213 
  (3.598)  (3.649)  (3.786) 
       
Observations  950  950  950 
Number of municipalities  95  95  95 
Fraction of variance due to ind. effects  0.895  0.925  0.907 
R
2  0.098  0.077  0.103 
R
2 within-group  0.658  0.673  0.689 
F test for municipality effects  4.680  4.340  4.940 
(pooled OLS vs. fixed-effects panel)  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Chi-squared test for random effects  51.980  55.330  106.800 
(random-effects vs. fixed-effects panel)  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in round brackets; p-values in square brackets; 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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TABLE 3. Effects conditional on the initial sorted waste ratio 
Sorters:  Weak  Strong  All 
Method: Panel OLS with Fixed Effects  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Previous (log) sorted waste ratio      0.543*** 
      (0.096) 
PAYT  0.180**  0.117**  2.358*** 
  (0.077)  (0.045)  (0.458) 
Additional years of PAYT  0.035**  -0.009  0.026*** 
  (0.016)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
PAYT × Previous (log) sorted waste ratio      -0.564*** 
      (0.114) 
DtD  0.031  0.160***  -0.165 
  (0.097)  (0.035)  (0.637) 
Additional years of DtD  -0.047*  0.014  -0.000 
  (0.026)  (0.015)  (0.009) 
DtD × Previous (log) sorted waste ratio      0.100 
      (0.170) 
If adjacent municipalities  0.206**  0.004  0.027 
with DtD and PAYT  (0.080)  (0.040)  (0.033) 
If adjacent municipalities  -0.217***  -0.017  -0.030 
with drop-off and flat fee  (0.070)  (0.034)  (0.022) 
PAYT × If adjacent municipalities  0.232**  -0.064  0.029 
with drop-off and flat fee  (0.088)  (0.043)  (0.033) 
Log(population density)  0.925  -0.375  -0.089 
  (0.797)  (0.432)  (0.059) 
% Children aged 14 or younger  0.078**  -0.036*  -0.014 
  (0.033)  (0.018)  (0.015) 
% Adults aged 65 or older  0.036  -0.011  0.005 
  (0.043)  (0.018)  (0.009) 
% Non-native residents  0.016  0.031***  0.006 
  (0.020)  (0.008)  (0.005) 
% Unemployment rate in the district  -0.067  -0.020  -0.033 
  (0.044)  (0.036)  (0.021) 
Year 1999  -0.554***  0.001   
  (0.129)  (0.054)   
Year 2000  -0.284***  -0.026  0.001 
  (0.092)  (0.056)  (0.036) 
Year 2001  -0.240***  -0.024  0.011 
  (0.075)  (0.050)  (0.037) 
Year 2002  -0.341**  0.122*  0.052 
  (0.134)  (0.070)  (0.056) 
Year 2005  -0.007  -0.027  -0.024* 
  (0.029)  (0.018)  (0.014) 
Year 2006  -0.049  -0.034  -0.040 
  (0.070)  (0.042)  (0.032) 
Year 2007  -0.039  -0.043  -0.054 
  (0.074)  (0.043)  (0.035) 
Year 2008  -0.070  -0.076  -0.070 
  (0.110)  (0.066)  (0.053) 
Constant  -2.915  6.636**  2.426*** 
  (5.042)  (2.702)  (0.596) 
       
Observations  320  310  855 
Number of municipalities  32  31  95 
Fraction of variance due to ind. effects  0.896  0.874   
R
2  0.245  0.124   
R
2 within-group  0.841  0.740   
F test for municipality effects  3.740  5.330   
(pooled OLS vs. fixed-effects panel)  [0.000]  [0.000]   
Chi-squared test for random effects  33.140  32.710   
(random-effects vs. fixed-effects panel)  [0.001]  [0.001]   
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions      81.782 
(null hypothesis: restrictions are valid)      [0.961] 
Note: Column (1) refers to “weak sorters”, with a sorting waste ratio lower than 37.680 as of 1999; Column (2) 
refers to “strong sorters”, with a sorting waste ratio higher than 44.245 as of 1999. Standard errors clustered 
by municipality in round brackets; p-values in square brackets; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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TABLE 4. Effects of incentives on the type of waste 
Waste (log of per capita kgs.)  Sorted  Unsorted  Total 
Sorters:  All  All  All  Weak  Strong 
Method: Panel OLS with Fixed Effects  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
PAYT  0.124***  -0.203***  0.001  0.014  -0.095** 
  (0.044)  (0.066)  (0.028)  (0.038)  (0.042) 
Additional years of PAYT  0.024**  -0.042***  -0.007  -0.016  0.006 
  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
DtD  0.050  -0.322***  -0.101***  -0.118***  -0.131*** 
  (0.044)  (0.057)  (0.021)  (0.040)  (0.026) 
Additional years of DtD  -0.024  -0.029  -0.025***  -0.001  -0.071*** 
  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.016) 
If adjacent municipalities  0.099**  -0.046  0.007  0.075  -0.026 
with DtD and PAYT  (0.040)  (0.042)  (0.023)  (0.053)  (0.039) 
If adjacent municipalities  -0.060*  0.134**  0.051**  0.079**  -0.011 
with drop-off and flat fee  (0.034)  (0.051)  (0.020)  (0.039)  (0.025) 
PAYT × If adjacent municipalities  0.055  -0.121  -0.072**  -0.104**  0.059 
with drop-off and flat fee  (0.062)  (0.077)  (0.031)  (0.050)  (0.041) 
Log(population density)  0.213  -1.567***  -0.779***  -0.821**  -0.569 
  (0.538)  (0.576)  (0.288)  (0.338)  (0.669) 
% Children aged 14 or younger  0.034  -0.024  -0.008  -0.014  0.026 
  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.011)  (0.018)  (0.021) 
% Adults aged 65 or older  0.008  -0.007  -0.005  -0.043***  0.004 
  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.028) 
% Non-native residents  -0.010  0.002  0.002  -0.003  0.004 
  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.012) 
% Unemployment rate in the district  0.004  0.059  0.053**  0.066*  0.078* 
  (0.041)  (0.047)  (0.024)  (0.036)  (0.043) 
Year 1999  -0.453***  -0.050  -0.183***  -0.094  -0.223*** 
  (0.070)  (0.067)  (0.036)  (0.074)  (0.069) 
Year 2000  -0.316***  -0.007  -0.131***  -0.059  -0.165** 
  (0.054)  (0.062)  (0.034)  (0.070)  (0.066) 
Year 2001  -0.218***  0.032  -0.077***  -0.028  -0.128*** 
  (0.047)  (0.049)  (0.026)  (0.048)  (0.045) 
Year 2002  -0.193**  0.059  -0.022  0.015  -0.157* 
  (0.077)  (0.083)  (0.039)  (0.060)  (0.084) 
Year 2005  0.016  0.046*  0.039***  0.016  0.089*** 
  (0.023)  (0.028)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.022) 
Year 2006  0.079  0.120  0.136***  0.108***  0.248*** 
  (0.063)  (0.072)  (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.058) 
Year 2007  0.098  0.153*  0.156***  0.113***  0.289*** 
  (0.069)  (0.079)  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.066) 
Year 2008  0.146  0.242**  0.243***  0.197***  0.434*** 
  (0.107)  (0.119)  (0.059)  (0.067)  (0.094) 
Constant  3.463  14.170***  10.280***  11.190***  8.482** 
  (3.246)  (3.409)  (1.737)  (2.065)  (4.136) 
           
Observations  950  950  950  320  310 
Number of municipalities  95  95  95  32  31 
Fraction of variance due to ind. effects  0.608  0.964  0.969  0.978  0.958 
R
2  0.437  0.005  0.212  0.322  0.175 
R
2 within-group  0.685  0.749  0.199  0.318  0.321 
F test for municipality effects  9.980  12.750  25.930  27.430  19.850 
(pooled OLS vs. fixed-effects panel)  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Chi-squared test for random effects  53.600  113.400  106.280  30.540  48.550 
(random-effects vs. fixed-effects panel)  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.000] 
Note: Column (4) refers to “weak sorters”, with a sorting waste ratio lower than 37.680 as of 1999; Column (5) 
refers to “strong sorters”, with a sorting waste ratio higher than 44.245 as of 1999. Standard errors clustered 
by municipality in round brackets; p-values in square brackets; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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TABLE 5. Effects of incentives only for towns in a consortium 





Sorted waste ratio 






Method: Panel OLS with Fixed Effects  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
PAYT  0.117**  0.007  0.110**  0.156*  0.124*** 
  (0.045)  (0.029)  (0.045)  (0.078)  (0.044) 
Additional years of PAYT  0.022**  -0.005  0.028***  0.019  -0.009 
  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.020)  (0.008) 
DtD  0.050  -0.105***  0.155**  0.040  0.153*** 
  (0.049)  (0.024)  (0.062)  (0.102)  (0.040) 
Additional years of DtD  -0.019  -0.026**  0.007  -0.026  0.025 
  (0.022)  (0.010)  (0.026)  (0.035)  (0.015) 
If adjacent municipalities  0.101**  0.008  0.093**  0.185**  0.027 
with DtD and PAYT  (0.044)  (0.025)  (0.037)  (0.087)  (0.043) 
If adjacent municipalities  -0.069*  0.056**  -0.125**  -0.249***  -0.017 
with drop-off and flat fee  (0.040)  (0.024)  (0.049)  (0.079)  (0.038) 
PAYT × If adjacent municipalities  0.059  -0.074**  0.132*  0.245**  -0.064 
with drop-off and flat fee  (0.064)  (0.033)  (0.071)  (0.092)  (0.046) 
Log(population density)  0.252  -0.774**  1.026  0.975  -0.567 
  (0.582)  (0.310)  (0.685)  (0.774)  (0.393) 
% Children aged 14 or younger  0.033  -0.011  0.044*  0.083**  -0.039* 
  (0.024)  (0.011)  (0.025)  (0.034)  (0.019) 
% Adults aged 65 or older  0.007  -0.009  0.016  0.047  -0.027 
  (0.025)  (0.015)  (0.025)  (0.047)  (0.016) 
% Non-native residents  -0.011  0.003  -0.014  0.008  0.031*** 
  (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.009) 
% Unemployment rate in the district  -0.001  0.054**  -0.055  -0.067  -0.040 
  (0.044)  (0.025)  (0.047)  (0.045)  (0.039) 
Year 1999  -0.470***  -0.179***  -0.291***  -0.564***  -0.015 
  (0.075)  (0.037)  (0.076)  (0.136)  (0.060) 
Year 2000  -0.302***  -0.129***  -0.173***  -0.275**  -0.032 
  (0.058)  (0.035)  (0.057)  (0.102)  (0.064) 
Year 2001  -0.222***  -0.070***  -0.152***  -0.230**  -0.036 
  (0.051)  (0.026)  (0.044)  (0.087)  (0.055) 
Year 2002  -0.175**  -0.006  -0.169**  -0.353**  0.130* 
  (0.082)  (0.038)  (0.084)  (0.138)  (0.074) 
Year 2005  0.012  0.038**  -0.026  -0.016  -0.034* 
  (0.025)  (0.015)  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.017) 
Year 2006  0.068  0.135***  -0.067  -0.057  -0.057 
  (0.069)  (0.038)  (0.080)  (0.075)  (0.043) 
Year 2007  0.085  0.153***  -0.068  -0.050  -0.066 
  (0.076)  (0.042)  (0.090)  (0.081)  (0.043) 
Year 2008  0.131  0.244***  -0.113  -0.087  -0.115* 
  (0.116)  (0.063)  (0.138)  (0.121)  (0.067) 
Constant  3.299  10.340***  -2.438  -3.416  8.101*** 
  (3.508)  (1.875)  (4.092)  (4.947)  (2.455) 
           
Observations  865  865  865  307  276 
Number of municipalities  91  91  91  31  29 
Fraction of variance due to ind. effects  0.605  0.969  0.908  0.903  0.930 
R
2  0.448  0.223  0.098  0.231  0.054 
R
2 within-group  0.682  0.197  0.686  0.842  0.739 
F test for municipality effects  8.820  23.490  4.540  3.320  6.000 
(pooled OLS vs. fixed-effects panel)  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Chi-squared test for random effects  54.870  101.850  99.760  26.450  31.250 
(random-effects vs. fixed-effects panel)  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.009]  [0.003] 
Note: Column (4) refers to “weak sorters”, with a sorting waste ratio lower than 37.680 as of 1999; Column (5) 
refers to “strong sorters”, with a sorting waste ratio higher than 44.245 as of 1999. Standard errors clustered 
by municipality in round brackets; p-values in square brackets; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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TABLE B.1. Flat-fee calculation in TV3 
Category  Number of 
Household 
Members 




Cost for a 100- 
square meter 
house 
€ per square 
meter
 
€ per user 
1  1  0.44  31.11  66.53  75.38 
2  2  0.52  62.04  103.66  114.06 
3  3  0.58  77.55  124.04  140.17 
4  4  0.63  100.81  151.29  163.90 
5  5  0.68  124.08  178.54  192.16 
6  6 or more  0.72  143.47  201.07  215.41 
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FIGURE 1. Dynamics of policy management 
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FIGURE 3. Effects on the sorted waste ratio by initial sorted waste ratio 
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FIGURE A.2. Consortia and municipalities in the district of Treviso 
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FIGURE B.1. A drop-off point for sorted and unsorted waste 
 
 
FIGURE B.2. Carts and bins for organic waste and unsorted waste in Priula 
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FIGURE B.6. The report sheet used in Priula to signal irregularities in waste sorting 
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